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Killing them with Kindness:
Negative Distributional Externalities of Increasing UI Benefits
Abstract
Of the many labour market Hartz IV reforms that have been implemented in
Germany since 2005,the role of short-term unemployment insurance has not
received much attention.In this paper we examine distributional effects of la-
bourearningsandunemploymentbenefitsusingsimulatedincreasesinunem-
ployment insurance replacement rates or equivalently, increases in the net
present value of benefit duration. Starting around an 18%-point increase in
the replacement rate, there are significant negative labour supply effects,
drawing those employed into unemployment shifting the mass of the earnings
distribution to the left. At around a 25%-point increase in the replacement
rate, the mass of the distribution shifts right again, as those receiving unem-
ployment benefits simply enjoy an increased transfer. Thus, due to the sub-
stantial negative labour supply effects,German economic policy should avoid
potentially increasing the UI benefit replacement rate (or equivalently, in-
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Starting in January 2008, for some age groups in Germany, the maximum
number of months of unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁt receipt was in-
creased from 18 to 24 months. This was seen as a way of tiding over
some older persons already under pressure of unemployment and bleak re-
employment prospects. As this eﬀectively increased the net present value of
the future stream of beneﬁt payments by a considerable amount, there may
indeed be some induced behavioural changes by those currently employed.
By increasing the amount or maximal length of beneﬁt receipt, is one eﬀec-
tively luring already employed persons into unemployment? What are the
eﬀects on the income distribution, given that with increased unemployment
beneﬁts, some persons rationally choose to enter into unemployment and col-
lect beneﬁts as opposed to working and earning own income.
The impact of unemployment insurance systems on the labour market is
surely one of the most thoroughly examined topics in labour economics. An
excellent overview of the earlier studies can be found in Hamermesh (1977)
and Welch (1977). With the advance of econometrics and distributional
analysis the emphasis in the literature shifted towards the analysis of policy
changes on distributional outcomes and heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects
(DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996, Heckman and Smith, 1997, Heckman,
2000, Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman, 2001). The general need for rigorous
program evaluation and the use of counterfactuals in policy evaluation is de-
scribed in Schmidt (2001) and Kluve (2004).
Special attention has been given to the link between the duration and
level of unemployment insurance payments and the probability and duration
of unemployment. While standard theories suggested a pure negative eﬀect
on employment (e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997 and Boone, Fredriksson,
Holmlund, and van Ours, 2007), a strand of models has emerged which allow
unemployment systems to have positive outcomes in the long run (Ben-Horim
and Zuckerman, 1987, Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, Acemoglu and Shimer,
2000).
Empirical research yields a mixed picture, with mostly negative outcomes
for the US and Canada (Baker and Rea Jr, 1998, Ham and Rea Jr, 1987,
Anderson and Meyer, 1997 and Meyer, 1990). In Europe, the main part of
the existing literature ﬁnds negative eﬀects of increases in level or length of
beneﬁt entitlement on employment probability and the transition from unem-
ployment into employment (Carling, Edin, Harkman, and Holmlund, 1996,
4Abbring, van den Berg, and Ours, 2005, Alba-Ramirez, 1999 and Fredriksson
and Holmlund, 2006).
A large literature for Germany exists, considering the general eﬀects of
the unemployment insurance system (Wilke, 2005, L¨ udemann, Wilke, and
Zhang, 2006, M¨ uller and Steiner, 2008, Heer, 2002 and Biewen and Wilke,
2005). Hunt (1995) speciﬁcally looks at changes in unemployment insurance
duration and ﬁnds negative eﬀects on the re-employment rate, which are pro-
nounced for elder males.
With the implementation of the Hartz IV reform, the literature extended
further. For a detailed overview of the reforms and changes associated with
Hartz IV see Jacobi and Kluve (2007). Special consideration has been given
to the link between unemployment beneﬁt level and duration, eﬀect hetero-
geneity and transition dynamics (Huber, Lechner, Walter, and Wunsch, 2009,
Lee and Wilke, 2005, Schmitz and Steiner, 2007).
The institutional setting of short term unemployment in Germany obvi-
ously plays an important role. In order to receive payments from the unem-
ployment insurance system, the responsible local unemployment agency has
to be notiﬁed in advance, as soon as a person receives notice of a prospective
job loss. The usual time span in Germany for the advance notice is three
months. Everyone is eligible for unemployment insurance who worked at
least 360 days in the last two years at a social security covered job, i.e. a
job which is part of the social security system1. To become oﬃcially regis-
tered one must be: (i) not employed, (ii) willing to participate in the labour
market and (iii) available to placement eﬀorts undertaken by the responsible
unemployment oﬃce to. Participants of active labour market programs are
not oﬃcially registered as unemployed. Once oﬃcially recognized as being
unemployed, an individual receives payments from the federal unemployment
oﬃce (Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit).
Unemployment insurance payments are calculated by taking the previous
gross wage, capped by the social security contribution ceiling (Beitragsbe-
messungsgrenze), subtracting income taxes. Further, the German Reuniﬁca-
tion Solidarity Transfer (Solidarit¨ atszuschlag)2 and a social security insurance
1Some exceptions from this general rule exist, like eligibility of males who were drafted
into the military/community service or woman who took some time oﬀ work to give birth
(Elternzeit).
2A certain percentage of the gross wage is taken away to pay for the costs of German
reuniﬁcation. It is deﬁned as roughly 5% of the income tax.
5lump sum (21% of the gross wage) are subtracted and this ﬁnal net previous
wage is then multiplied by 60% or 67% respectively, depending on the pres-
ence of children in the household. Payments cease after a certain maximum
receipt period, which depends on the length of time one paid contributions
into the insurance system. The minimum receipt period is at least 6 months
and the longest 24 months. These time spans have been subject to large
changes in the past. After exhausting the maximum receipt of UI, unem-
ployed persons are entitled to receive means-tested unemployment assistance
(commonly known as Hartz IV) for an a priori indeﬁnite time span. See also
Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) for a discussion of social assis-
tance.
Contributions to the unemployment insurance system consist of 3% of the
gross wage. This sum is split and half is payed by the employer, the other
half by the employee. An upper limit of the social security contribution ceil-
ing which becomes adjusted every year, is imposed to conﬁne payments from
and to the insurance system.
This paper oﬀers new insights into the potential negative incentive eﬀects
of increasing (short-term) unemployment insurance beneﬁts in Germany. Re-
cently, especially for older unemployed workers, the maximal length of UI
receipt was extended from 18 to 24 months, eﬀectively increasing the net
present value of the stream of payments by more than 30% for some age
groups. Using a static model based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), we simulate increases in UI beneﬁts in this magnitude range and
show that sizable portions of the working population close to, but over the
50% working probability threshold are lured away from gainful employment
into taking unemployment beneﬁts, thereby reducing their “earnings” and
impacting negatively on the earnings distribution. We simulate increases of
25 to 40% of the current beneﬁt level and ﬁnd that an increase of 30-35% of
UI beneﬁts can induce a 5-20%-point increase in the head count ratio below
a pre-increase median “earnings” level.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is a representative longi-
tudinal study of private households in Germany. Starting in 1984, the same
private households were followed each year. In 1990, after reuniﬁcation,
the panel was extended to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).
Apart from the samples for east and west Germany, the SOEP consists of
6ﬁve other subsamples, such as the Immigrant Sample which was integrated
in 1994 (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005 for more technical information
on the SOEP). The data include information on objective and subjective
aspects.3
In this study, men aged 18 to 65 who reside in Germany are included in
the analysis, covering the years 2002 to 2007 (2002-2004 before the Hartz Re-
forms and 2005-2007 after the Hartz Reforms had been implemented). The
total sample consists of 45,083 valid person-year observations. We augment
the basic micro dataset with additional institutional generated variables. For
each person, a counterfactual unemployment beneﬁt is calculated, based on
the person’s current net earnings (net of taxes, social security contributions
and health insurance payments). We take into account the social security
contribution ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze), which has changed several
times in recent years, when calculating potential beneﬁts. In calculating the
net labour income, we also implement the year-speciﬁc administrative income
tax rates valid for the years in question.
Table 2 outlines the simulation strategy. Table 3 displays the regression
results corresponding to the steps in Table 2. We estimate a simple earnings
function (Yit = net labour income) for employed males by random eﬀects
panel,
Yit = α + βXit +  i + uit (1)
and a function for the UI beneﬁt,
UIit = a + bXit + ei + vit (2)
in which our controls Xit include indicators for year dummies, years of edu-
cation, age, east/west, and immigrant status. We then predict for males not
working the net labour earnings and the potential UI beneﬁt. We estimate
a pooled binary probit model for the time period 2002-2007 for the variable
working (Wit),
Wit = θ + κZit + γ ˆ Yit + δ ˆ UIit + εit (3)
3The dataset was extracted using PanelWhiz. See Haisken-DeNew (2007) and
Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006). For more information on the SOEP, please see
http://www.diw.de/soep.
7in which our controls Zit include indicators for years of education, age,
east/west, net labour earnings and potential UI beneﬁts, such that the prob-
ability that an individual becomes unemployed is given by a conditional
expectation function:
P =( y = k|Zit, ˆ Yit, ˆ UIit)=pki (4)
where k = 1 if individual i becomes unemployed and k = 0 otherwise, i.e.
stays employed and Z is a vector of observable individual characteristics just
mentioned. A person is considered to be employed if the probability of him
being employed is greater than or equal to 50%.
Critical for the model is that the coeﬃcient γ is positive signiﬁcant and
that δ is negative signiﬁcant. After estimating this probability for each person
observed in our data, we can simulate new counterfactual employment proba-
bilities by adjusting the unemployment beneﬁt to some arbitrarily higher level
and recalculate the employment probability. Should the person no longer
have an employment probability greater than 50%, he is deemed to be un-
employed and receives the counterfactual UI beneﬁt. If his new predicted
probability of employment is above 50%, he receives his wage. Thus, own
wages and (short-term) unemployment insurance are combined into a total
labour “earnings” distribution (own income plus unemployment beneﬁts).
Various scenarios are tested, such that the counterfactual unemployment
beneﬁt is increased up to 40% of the original levels.
An increase in the unemployment beneﬁt of this magnitude (25-40%)
might sound unreasonably high. However, the present discounted value of
a maximal beneﬁt receipt has eﬀectively been increased more than 30% for
the older age categories starting Jan 1, 2008, just simply due to the fact that
number of months of UI receipt has been increased from 18 to 24 months.
Using the formula of net present value4, assuming an annual interest rate of
5% and increasing the number of months from 18 to 24 months as mandated
for 58 year olds5, this increase of more than 30% holds.
4NPV = A
i [1 − 1
(1+i)n], where A is the beneﬁt payment, i is the eﬀective monthly
interest rate, and n the maximal number of months of beneﬁt receipt.
5§127 paragraph 2, SGB III
83 Empirical Results
Table 3 displays the estimated parameters of the earnings, UI beneﬁt and
probability models respectively. All standard control variables have the ex-
pected signs and are signiﬁcant. Examining column (3), we ﬁnd that γ is
signiﬁcant and positive, whereas δ correspondingly is negative and signiﬁ-
cant. Thus a higher expected wage increases the probability of employment
and a higher expected unemployment insurance beneﬁt controlling for the
wage, elicits a reduced probability of employment. Speciﬁcally, a e1000 in-
crease in net labour earnings increases the probability of working by 21.6%-
points, whereas the same increase in UI beneﬁts reduces the probability of
working by 30.2%. The UI beneﬁt variable is interacted with a dummy vari-
able corresponding to one for the time period after implementation of the
Hartz IV reforms (2006 and 2007) to identify to what extent there had been
any change in behaviour after the reforms. However, this eﬀect is insignif-
icant and therefore, we can conclude that there has not been any observed
behavioural change aﬀecting the probability of working due to the level of
UI beneﬁts since the implementation of the Hartz IV reforms.
We take the analysis to the next step and implement the simulations. We
ﬁrst observe the baseline “earnings” distribution without any changes to the
UI beneﬁt. Then we simulate increases in the UI beneﬁt of 25%, 30% 35%
and 40%. Additional beneﬁts lower than a 25% increase do not indicate any
induced unemployment eﬀects and are therefore not reported here.
Figure 1 shows the baseline earnings distribution (thinnest line) and the
corresponding earnings distributions for simulated increases of UI beneﬁts
from 25% to 40% (thickest line). We separate the eﬀects before and after the
Hartz IV reforms. As one sees in the ﬁgure, there is no behavioural diﬀerence
discernable between before and after.
To expand on the graphical representation, we include an FGT(0) repre-
sentation of (a) being under a “poverty” line of 60% of the median baseline
income as observed in 2002 and (b) being under the median baseline income
of 2002, as shown in Table 1. A positive increase less than 25% produces neg-
ligible changes in the head count ratio (HCR) for both measures. The table
provides a 95% conﬁdence interval with the explicit lower and upper bounds
reported. In the far left tail of the distribution, there appear to be no sig-
niﬁcant changes: the upper bound of the baseline (0.1142) overlaps with the
lower bound of the 40% simulation (0.1091). This is mirrored in the graphical
representation in Figure 1. However, when simply examining movements to
9Table 1: Increased UI and Leftward Movements of “Earnings” Distribution
UI Increase HCR<60%·Median Lower Bound Upper Bound
Baseline 0.0904 0.0666 0.1142
25% 0.0951 0.0723 0.1180
30% 0.1049 0.0841 0.1258
35% 0.1278 0.1122 0.1434
40% 0.1253 0.1091 0.1416
UI Increase HCR<Median Lower Bound Upper Bound
Baseline 0.4585 0.4481 0.4689
25% 0.4667 0.4560 0.4774
30% 0.5057 0.4532 0.5582
35% 0.6463 0.5825 0.7101
40% 0.7466 0.7371 0.7560
Note: Point estimates with 95% conﬁdence interval.
HCR is the “head count ratio”. Median is from 2002.
the left of the baseline median, we ﬁnd very large eﬀects. Simulations with
increases between 30 and 35% already create signiﬁcant movements below
the baseline median with the HCR increasing by some 5 to 20%-points (from
0.4585 to as much as 0.6463).
4 Conclusions
This paper oﬀers new insights into the potential negative incentive eﬀects of
increasing (short-term) unemployment insurance beneﬁts in Germany. Re-
cently, especially for older unemployed workers, the maximal length of UI
receipt was extended from 18 to 24 months, eﬀectively increasing the net
present value of the stream of payments by more than 30%. Using a static
model based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we simulate
increases in UI beneﬁts in this magnitude range and show that sizable por-
tions of the working population close to, but over the 50% working probability
threshold may be lured away from gainful employment into taking unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, thereby reducing their “earnings” and impacting negatively
on the earnings distribution.
10Thus policies potentially intended to “help” unemployed persons have
unwanted negative externalities of inducing additional unemployment. We
quantify these eﬀects with our parsimonious three equation model, taking
into account not only labour supply behaviour but also the institutional in-
come tax structure and ﬁnd substantial movement especially in the middle of
the “earnings” distribution. An increase of 30-35% of UI beneﬁts can induce
a 5-20%-point increase in the head count ratio below a pre-increase median
“earnings” level. Thus policy makers should be wary of increasing either the
beneﬁt level for a given receipt time span or increasing simply the maximal
beneﬁt duration, as both policies eﬀectively increase the net present value of
the stream of beneﬁts. Our simple model shows that employed persons do
indeed respond to the weakened incentives and are lured into unemployment
receipt. Further, the Hartz IV reforms appear not to have inﬂuenced any be-
havioural changes, as the simulation results are almost identical before and
after the Hartz IV reforms were introduced in January 2005.
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145 Appendix
Table 2: Simulating UI Increases and Impact on Earnings Distribution
1. We construct net labour earnings based on gross earnings information,
removing taxes, and various social security contributions for all those
employed (based on administrative rules). See Table 3, column (1) for
estimation results.
2. We calculate counterfactual unemployment insurance entitlements for
each employed person, up to the social security contribution ceiling
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) of 67% for persons with children and 60%
for those without children. See Table 3, column (2) for estimation
results.
3. For unemployed males, we calculate a potential wage and a correspond-
ing UI entitlement.
4. Using a labour supply model, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects for own
potential wage and signiﬁcant negative eﬀects for the level of entitle-
ment. See Table 3, column (3) for estimation results.
5. We simulate increases in the replacement rate and calculate the im-
pact on the probability of employment, deﬁne a counterfactual em-
ployment level and thereby create a counterfactual “earnings” (=labour
earnings+unemployment insurance) distribution.
6. Increasing UI beneﬁts shift the “earnings” distribution to the left. We
calculate for each level of additional UI beneﬁt, by how much the dis-
tribution (head count ratio) has shifted left of the (a) original 2002
baseline median and (b) original “poverty line” (60% of the 2002 base-
line median).
15Table 3: Estimated Parameters for Simulation Model
(1) (2) (3)
Random Eﬀects Panel Random Eﬀects Panel Binary Probit
Net Income UI Beneﬁts Working
Year Dummy 2003 84.981 298.833∗∗∗ −
(84.834) (31.311)
Year Dummy 2004 1322.226∗∗∗ 1054.065∗∗∗ −
(87.265) (32.271)
Year Dummy 2005 584.089∗∗∗ 595.498∗∗∗ −
(90.584) (33.574)
Year Dummy 2006 662.518∗∗∗ 584.586∗∗∗ −
(93.090) (34.633)
Year Dummy 2007 918.598∗∗∗ 777.690∗∗∗ −
(96.665) (36.094)
Years Education 1446.267∗∗∗ 631.997∗∗∗ -0.010
(30.418) (11.925) (0.019)
Age 304.068∗∗∗ 133.894∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(7.589) (3.010) (0.004)
East Germany -5527.469∗∗∗ -2695.283∗∗∗ -0.117
(213.132) (83.544) (0.072)
Immigrant -1214.318∗∗∗ -145.790 −
(305.875) (121.545)
Est. Net Income (1) −− 0.216∗∗∗
(0.022)
Est. UI Beneﬁt (2) −− -0.302∗∗∗
(0.041)
Est. UI Beneﬁt 2006+ −− -0.000
(0.002)
Constant -9485.806∗∗∗ -2012.880∗∗∗ 1.350∗∗∗
(442.627) (174.251) (0.168)
N 39358 39503 45083
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
16Figure 1: Simulated UI: Before and After the Hartz IV Reforms
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